Targeted Advertising on Social Media: Transparency, Control, Fairness, Privacy

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
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems

Ad targeting in social media

- This talk: Focus on Facebook social media platform
 - By far, the largest social media platform
 - In terms of number of users
 - In terms of data aggregated on users
 - In terms of advertisers & ad revenues
- Leader in introducing novel targeting practices
- However, the issues generalize to other social media platforms
 - Like LinkedIn, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram etc.,

Background: Ad targeting on Facebook

Ads on Facebook





€29.39 http://www.lightinthebox.com/ Herrenhalbschuhe



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English (US) · Español (España) · Català · Português (Brasil) · Français (France)



Data used for targeting ads

Facebook gathers lots of data (features) on users

	Behaviors								Demographics					Interests																						
Category	Anniversary	Consumer Class.	Digital activities	Expats	Mobile Device User	Multicultural Affinity	Seasonal and Events	Travel	Automotive	Charitable donations	Financial	Job role	Media	Purchase behavior	Residential profiles	Business-to-business	Education level	Generation	Home	Life Events	Parents	Politics (US)	Relationship status	Work	Financial	Business and industry	Entertainment	Family/relationships	Fitness and wellness	Food and drink	Hobbies and activities	Shopping and fashion	Sports and outdoors	Technology	Other	Total
Facebook	1	2	39	74	81	6	2	- 5									13	3	2	36	9	8	16	26		39	70	-8	11	37	60	21	22	21	2	614
Acxiom									1	- 5	25	2	35	23	2				19						16											128
Epsilon										- 4	- 1			5	2							2												ı		14
Experian														3	- 1				- 1															ı		5
Datalogix								11	151			1		144		29			2		11			1										ı		350
Total	1	2	39	74	81	6	2	16	152	9	26	3	35	175	5	29	13	3	24	36	20	10	16	27	16	39	70	8	11	37	60	21	22	21	2	1,111

Closer look at features: Examples

- Demographical (gathered by Facebook)
 - Relationship:
 - Interested In: Men and Women, Men, Unspecified, Women
 - Status: Separated, Widowed, Open Relationship, Divorced, In a relationship, Married, Engaged, Unspecified, Single, Complicated Civil Union, Domestic Partnership
- Each user feature is a boolean variable
- Demographical (aggregated from data brokers)
 - Financial:
 - Income: Geschätztes monatliches Nettoeinkommen 2.000 bis 2.600, 2.600 bis 3.600, 3.600 bis 5.000, über 5.000 Euro

Data aggregation across countries

Country	Facebook	Epsilor	n DLX I	Experian	Acxion	1 Total
US	598	14	350	5	128	1105
UK	598	0	19	17	103	737
France	598	0	0	0	21	619
Germany	598	0	0	0	60	658
Australia	598	0	0	34	24	656
Brazil	598	0	0	20	0	618
Japan	598	0	0	0	17	615
South Korea	598	0	0	0	0	598
Canada	598	0	0	0	0	598
India	598	0	0	0	0	598


How Facebook advertisers target users

1) Traditional targeting: Advertisers specify a boolean formula over the features

- Typically, in a restricted CNF form
 - □ (F1 v F2 v F3....) ^ (F'1 v F'2 v F'3....) ^ ^ -FK ^ -F'K
- Users are targeted, when their feature values inferred by Facebook satisfy the targeting formula

How Facebook advertisers target users

2) Custom audience targeting: Advertisers upload PII of users they wish to target



How Facebook advertisers target users

2) Custom audience targeting: Advertisers upload PII of users they wish to target

Site	Name	Email	Phone number	City or ZIP	State or Province	Birthday, Gender	Employer	Site user ID	Mobile advertiser ID	
Facebook	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	Π
Instagram	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	/	X	✓	✓	
Twitter	X	✓	✓	Х	X	X	X	✓	✓	
Google	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X	Х	✓	✓	
Pinterest	X	1	X	Х	X	X	X	X	✓	
LinkedIn	X	✓	X	X	X	X	/	X	✓	

Advertisers love custom audience

1. Transparency

2. Control

3. Fairness

4. Privacy

Transparency
 '18]

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2. Control

3. Fairness'187

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4. Privacy '187

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1. Transparency

Can I know what data about me is used to target ads?


2. Control

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Transparency of Facebook ad targeting

Facebook provides transparency via explanations



At times to satisfy legal requirements

Explanations are great, but are they...

- Complete?
- Correct?
- Personalized?
- Deterministic?

Useful?

Need standards for explanations

To guard against adversarial explanations:

- Insufficient / unsatisfactory explanations
 - That offer no insightful / actionable information to consumers

- Misleading / fake explanations:
 - Designed to influence consumers to behave a certain way
 - Designed to gain consumer acceptance for a service

How complete are the explanations?

- For ads targeting customer PII:
 - "One reason you're seeing this ad is that Booking.com wants to reach people who have visited their website or used one of their apps. This is based on customer information provided by Booking.com.."

- Doesn't state what PII Booking.com used!
 - E.g., Did booking.com use email? Or phone number? Or name/address?

How complete are the explanations?

- For ads targeting data broker info:
 - "One reason you're seeing this ad is that Peugeot wants to reach people who are part of an audience created based on data provided by Acxiom. Facebook works with data providers to help businesses find the right audiences for their ads. Learn more about data providers."
- Doesn't state what Acxiom provided data was used!
 - E.g., is it based on financial data? Or purchasing habits?

How complete are the explanations?

- For ads targeting FB user data:
 - Beyond location, gender, age: picks exactly one of the several features used in targeting formula
 - "One reason you're seeing this ad is that Peek & Cloppenburg wants to reach people interested in Shopping and fashion, based on activity such as liking Pages or clicking on ads."
 - "There may be other reasons why you're seeing this advert, including that Acer wants to reach people aged 18 to 45 who live or have recently been in Germany. This is information based on your Facebook profile and where you've connected to the Internet."

Validation of incompleteness

- Ran a controlled ad targeting ourselves using a custom list and selecting millennials & expats
 - "One of the reasons why you're seeing this advert is because we think that you may be in the Millennials audience. This is based on what you do on Facebook.."
- Only one feature, millennials (not expats), shown!

Worse, the explanations are misleading!

- Ran a controlled ad targeting ourselves using a custom list and selecting millennials & expats
 - "There may be other reasons why you're seeing this advert, including that Acer wants to reach people aged 18 and above who live or have recently been in Germany. This is information based on your Facebook profile and where you've connected to the Internet."
- Never used features shown in explanations!

Do explanations need to be complete?

- Should they specify all features in ad targeting?
- Arguments for:
 - Avoids misleading / fake explanations:
 - Designed to gain consumer acceptance for a service
 - Builds trust and incentivizes cooperation
- Arguments against:
 - Targeting formula may be a business secret
 - Overloads users with information
 - Need succinct explanations

Selecting features for explanations

Example explanation:

"One reason you're seeing this ad is that Peek & Cloppenburg wants to reach people interested in Shopping and fashion, based on activity such as liking Pages or clicking on ads."

- Are the explained features the most important?
 - Is Shopping and fashion the most important of all the user' features that Facebook and the advertised used to target the user?

How Facebook selects features to explain

- Ran controlled ads to reverse-engineer Facebook's feature selection strategy
- Facebook appears to prioritize features based on
 - Their type: Demographic > Interest > PII > Behavioral
 - Their prevalence: Most prevalent first
- Unclear, if this is the right prioritization for users

Open challenges

How to pick a few (K) features for explanations?

- How to determine the importance of a user feature?
 - Does it reveal privacy sensitive information?
 - Is it a rare (or low prevalence) feature in population?
 - Does it exert the most influence?
 - On sizing the target audience?
 - As measured by "Quantifying Input Influence" framework?

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Do explanations offer consumers satisfactory control?

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Useful explanations enable control


Consumer control over ads

- Control Inputs: Determine data used for targeting ads
 - Help consumers protect their privacy

- Control Ouputs: Determine ads they receive
 - Help consumers achieve specific decision outcomes

Consumer controls in Facebook

 Facebook claims that ad preferences page allows control over what ads users see



In reality, it offers controls over inputs, not outputs!

Do explanations offer output control?

Given the incompleteness of explained features:

"One reason you're seeing this ad is that Peek & Cloppenburg wants to reach people interested in Shopping and fashion, based on activity such as liking Pages or clicking on ads."

- Are the explained features necessary?
 - If the user asked Facebook to remove their data on shopping and fashion, would they stop receiving the ad?
 - No guarantees!

Do explanations offer output control?

Given the incompleteness of explained features:

"One reason you're seeing this ad is that Peek & Cloppenburg wants to reach people interested in Shopping and fashion, based on activity such as liking Pages or clicking on ads."

- Are the explained features sufficient?
 - If the user asked Facebook to change their data on features other than shopping and fashion, would they continue to receive the ad?
 - No guarantees!

Open challenges

- Given the incompleteness of explained features
- How to construct necessary/sufficient explanations?
 - Technically challenging for arbitrary targeting formulae!
 - Finding min. set of necessary or sufficient features
 - Often, maps to solving NP-Complete SAT problem
 - But, can leverage recent advances on SAT solvers!

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Can we detect & prevent discriminatory ad targeting?

4. Privacy

Can ad targeting be discriminatory?



Online Ads for High-Paying Jobs Are Targeting Men More Than ...

Adweek - 7 Jul 2015

"We found small instances where there was discrimination and gender-based discrimination in job ads," said ... The issue of bias and discrimination in ad targeting isn't new, ... The Carnegie Mellon researchers also were alarmed by ads that ... (Google's rules forbid serving ads based on health information.).

Carnegie Mellon Study Finds Gender Discrimination In Ads Shown ... Marketing Land - 8 Jul 2015

When Algorithms Discriminate

New York Times - 9 Jul 2015

Probing the Dark Side of Google's Ad-Targeting System

Highly Cited - MIT Technology Review - 6 Jul 2015

Google's Ad System Has Become Too Big to Control

In-Depth - Wired - 9 Jul 2015

Google's algorithm shows prestigious job ads to men, but not to ...

Highly Cited - Washington Post - 6 Jul 2015













Marketing Land New York Tim... The Guardian Washington P... Chicago Tribu...

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Can ad targeting be discriminatory?



Facebook To Ban 'Ethnic Affinity' Targeting For Housing ...

Forbes - 11 Nov 2016

After weeks of push back from U.S. lawmakers, media and civil rights leaders, Facebook FB +0.18% on Friday announced it will stop allowing ...


Facebook disables 'ethnic affinity' ads for housing, jobs Engadget - 11 Nov 2016

Facebook to stop ads that target, exclude races Highly Cited - USA TODAY - 11 Nov 2016

Facebook to Remove 'Ethnic Affinity' Targeting From Certain Ad ... International - AgencySpy - 11 Nov 2016

Facebook has discriminated against you, and it's not going to stop In-Depth - Mashable - 12 Nov 2016

Facebook Bans Targeting Based on Race and Ethnicity for Housing ... Blog - Slate Magazine (blog) - 11 Nov 2016













Engadget

TechCrunch

Deadline

Daily Mail

SlashGear

USA TODAY

View all

Facebook's first defense

- Ethnic affinity is not ethnicity
- Can we verify how correlated they are?
- Used voter records from NC to check correlations
 - Voter records have race information
 - Created separate customer lists for different races
 - Checked correlations between their race & ethnic affinity

	Voter Records		Facebook Users						
Attribute	Number	Percent	Uploaded	Matched	Reachable	Reachable %	Corresponding	Corresponding %	
White	5,303,383	70.1%	10,000	8,000	6,800	85.0%	5,700	83.8%	
Black	1,694,220	22.4%	10,000	7,800	6,300	80.8%	5,200	82.5%	
Asian	79,250	1.0%	10,000	7,700	6,600	85.7%	1,900	28.8%	
Hispanic	163,236	2.2%	10,000	7,000	5,900	84.3%	3,000	50.8%	

Does banning "ethnic affinity" help?

- What about pre-filtered custom lists:
 - using offline info like voter records?

What of other correlated features?

no	feature name	selectivity	Blacks percentage	rest percentage	ratio
1	Demographic > Ethnic Affinity > African American (US)	17.0%	77.0%	10.9%	7.06
2	Demographic > Politics (US) > US Politics (Very Liberal)	11.8%	49.8%	7.7%	6.44
3	Interests > Entertainment > Music > Gospel music	14.4%	48.3%	14.6%	3.32
4	Interests > Shopping and fashion > Beauty > Hair products	12.2%	40.8%	12.9%	3.15

no	feature name	selectivity	Blacks percentage	rest percentage	ratio
1	Demographic > Politics (US) > US Politics (Very Conservative)	14.4%	4.8%	26.5%	0.18
2	Demographic > Politics (US) > US Politics (Conservative)	16.6%	6.5%	29.7%	0.22
3	Interests > Sports and outdoors > Outdoor recreation > Hiking	11.0%	8.0%	21.6%	0.37
4	Interests > Sports and outdoors > Outdoor recreation > Camping	11.4%	11.5%	22.8%	0.50

Open challenges

- How to detect discriminatory targeting in ads?
 - Particularly, with customer lists?
- How to avoid discriminatory targeting in ads?
 - Detecting & avoiding algo. discrimination is a hot topic
 - But, even here ads pose unique challenges
- Fair targeting might result in unfair ad impressions!
 - Targeting 100 men & 100 women might result in unequal impressions, when costs of their impressions are different!

This talk: 4 Aspects of Ad Targeting

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- Can we detect & prevent discriminatory targeting?
- Unclear need new measures & methods for fairness

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
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4. Privacy

Are there any privacy risks with targeted ads?

Potential audience reach estimate

A feature of Facebook's advertiser interface



Privacy risks from audience estimates

Assume exact estimates of audience size

- Then, given a user's PII
 - □ Like phone-num. or email-id. or name-address
- Any advertiser can check if the user is on Facebook
- And match different PIIs linked to a Facebook user
 - Link emails to mobile phone numbers or,
 - Link Facebook pixels to phone numbers

The dangers of linking user PIIs

THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE > PAKISTAN

Facebook turns down Pakistan's request to link accounts with mobile numbers

By Tech Desk Published: July 15, 2017









Pakistan's mobile phone owners told: be fingerprinted or lose your sim card

Government launches mass drive to gather biometric data from mobile owners in attempt to combat terrorism

Hackers Are Hijacking Phone Numbers And Breaking Into Email, Bank ...

https://www.forbes.com/.../hackers-are-hijacking-phone-numbers-and-breaking-into-e... ▼
Dec 21, 2016 - If you port your main number to Google Voice, you should still separate your main email address from that used for your other sensitive accounts so if your Passwords can easily be stolen through phishing attacks in which the hacker poses as a legitimate service and asks the user to enter their password ...

Precision of audience reach estimates

- Reverse-engineered how the estimates work
- No estimates given when the audience reach < 20</p>
- Estimates are rounded
 - □ Audience reach < 1000, rounded down to closest 10
 - □ Audience reach < 10000, rounded down to closest 100
 - □ Audience reach < 100000, rounded down to closest 1000
 -

Privacy risks from audience estimates

- Given any customer list S with and a user U's PII
 - Like phone-num. or email-id. or name-address
- Create a new customer list with S + U

- Is audience reach for S + U is more than S?
 - If it does, user U is on FB
 - One can similarly retrieve all the info FB has on the user
 - If not, either U is not on FB OR it's a rounding error

The probability of rounding errors

- □ For a list S with audience reach > 20 & < 1000</p>
 - Rounding error probability is 0.9
- □ For K-lists with audience reach > 20 & < 1000
 - □ Chance of every try suffering a rounding error is 0.9^K
 - □ Chance of at-least one try not being rounded is 1-0.9^K
 - \blacksquare For K = 100, this is chance is 99.999974%
- So by creating 100 lists with reach > 20 & < 1000
 - One can w.h.p. retrieve all data FB has on any user

How to create such customer lists

- Use public voter records in the US!
 - Randomly sample names/addresses from records
 - □ Till you get a customer list of size > 20 & < 1000!
 - Repeat the process 100 times!

- Validation: Linked email ids of multiple users in US, Germany, and France to their phone numbers!
 - Worked with Facebook to deploy a fix for linking PIIs

Open challenges

- Online ad APIs are becoming rich and complex
 - Facebook's ad interface might have more vulnerabilities

- Facebook is just one of several online ad platforms
 - Google, Twitter, and others have own set of ad APIs

How can one systematically analyze data broker ad APIs for privacy vulnerabilities?

Summary: Ad Targeting on Social

Media Transparency '18]

[NDSS

Limited! Only some (not all) data used for is revealed

2. Control

Limited! Providing satisfactory explanations is non-trivial

3. Fairness '18]

Unclear! Need new measures & methods for fairness

4. Privacy

[IEEE S&P '18]

SFAT

Vulnerable! Avoiding data leaks via ads is non-trivial!